C cancellability and the Primary/Secondary Meaning Distinction

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1. Overview
Among the criteria Grice (1989: 39-40) proposed for identifying conversational implicatures, cancellability is unquestionably the most celebrated one and the one that is often used as the main, obvious test for classifying speaker’s meaning as implicit. Problems with fitting some rather obstinate examples under the requirement of cancellability have led some critics to proposing amendments to Grice’s original formulation of the test (Weiner 2006; Blome-Tillmann 2008). The purpose of my contribution to the debate is twofold. Firstly, to demonstrate that, in spite of the recent criticism, Grice’s cancellability test remains a reliable and effective criterion. The second objective is to employ the test for the discussion and delimitation of the primary and secondary meanings vis-à-vis the what is said/implicated distinction. The test is implemented in the current paradigm of contextualism, including its arguably most radical variety of Default Semantics which models the main, most salient meaning (called here the primary meaning) as intended by the model speaker and recovered by the model addressee (Jaszczolt 2005, 2009, forthcoming a). On such a construal, cancellability is assessed separately for the domains of primary and secondary meanings, as well as for what is said and what is implicated. The structure of the paper is as follows.
Section 2 introduces Grice’s criterion of cancellability. Section 3 critically assesses a suggestion proposed recently in the literature that the criterion is defunct, discusses an attempt to save the criterion, and concludes that it is not in need of any amendment, albeit its original formulation by Grice easily yields to misinterpretation. Section 4 adopts the ‘saved’ criterion and applies it to the explicit/implicit distinction. Section 5 follows suit by taking up the issue.
of cancellation and processing, discussing the question of the stage in the incremental processing at which cancellation occurs. Section 6 is the core part of the paper. It builds on the discussions from the preceding two sections and focuses on cancellability vis-à-vis the primary meaning/secondary meaning distinction, where the distinction is construed as orthogonal to that between the explicit and the implicit content – in agreement with the assumptions of Default Semantics and the requirement of modelling salient, intentional meanings as primary meanings independently of their relation to the structure of the uttered sentence. The conclusions of the paper are then twofold: firstly, they concern the defence of Grice’s criterion of cancellability, and secondly, the defence of the distinction between primary and secondary meanings which cuts across that between the explicit and the implicit. The role of the criterion in these two distinctions is assessed.

2. Grice on Cancellability

Blome-Tillmann (2008: 156) writes:

‘[T]he cancellability test has traditionally been considered the most reliable and effective criterion for distinguishing conversational implicatures from other linguistic phenomena – such as conventional implicature, semantic entailment and semantic presupposition…’.

He devotes his article to constructing its defence from some recent objections. Before assessing these objections and his reply, it is advisable to go back to the source and assess Grice’s own view on the test he proposes. Grice (1989: 44) says that a putative conversational implicature can be cancelled in two ways. It is explicitly cancellable when it is possible to add to the utterance implicating \( p \), ‘but not \( p \)’ or ‘I don’t mean to imply that \( p \)’. This type of cancellation of a potential implicature takes place in the same discourse situation, in the dynamically developing context. There are two scenarios that pertain to this explicit cancellability: (i) the speaker utters a sentence, the addressee processes it and ‘recovers’ an implicature which is subsequently cancelled by the added clause, or (ii) the speaker utters a sentence and the potential implicature does not arise due to the intervention of the added cancellation phrase. Explicit cancellation is the standard, common-sense cancellation for most Gricean pragmaticists in that what they are interested in is the mechanism that governs a particular situation of discourse, including the principles for intention recovery and intention ascription by the addressee (see e.g. Haugh 2008; Jaszczolt 1999), as well as principles for contextual and other salient enrichment of the meaning of the uttered sentence (see e.g.
Levinson 2000; Recanati 2004, 2007), where the object of investigation is the situated act of speech. Next, a putative conversational implicature is *contextually* cancellable if there are imaginable situations in which such a potential implicature would not arise (Grice 1989: 44). This type of cancellation is a very different phenomenon indeed. It pertains to a more traditional (from our current perspective) view on conversation in which, what is of interest to the pragmaticist is the uttered sentence and its properties as seen from the perspective of the intentional content that can be associated with it in different contexts. In other words, *contextual cancellation* pertains to implicatures which are only, so to speak, ‘potential for the sentence’, while *explicit cancellation* pertains to implicatures which are in addition ‘potential for the given situation of discourse’.²

These two types of cancellation are thus very different indeed. They are defined for very different objects of study. Explicit cancellation is an empirical, verifiable fact of conversation as it occurs as part of linguistic, communicative interaction. It pertains to potential sentence-based inferences, dubbed by Grice generalized conversational implicatures (henceforth: GCIs) as in example (1a), or more widely, to expression-based inferences, bearing in mind more recent evidence on the locality of such inferences which can also be word-based as in (1b) (Levinson 2000; Jaszczolt 2005).

(1a) Some people said they liked the food.
    Potential GCI: Not all people liked the food.
    Cancellation clause: In fact, everybody liked it.

(1b) Some [potential GCI: not all], in fact all, people liked the food.

This type of cancellation also pertains to potential contextual implicatures or Grice’s particularized implicatures (PCIs), as exemplified in (2).

(2) The dog wants to go out.
    Potential PCI: The speaker wants the addressee to take the dog for a walk.
    Cancellation clause: I will take it for a walk.

² Horn (2004: 6) says, ‘Speakers implicate, hearers infer’. While remaining in agreement with Horn on the essentials, I shall use a term ‘potential implicature’, meaning by it the result of potential inference by a hearer. The same disclaimer applies to Burton-Roberts 2006: I agree that cancellation of intended implicature is impossible.
Contextual cancellation is a more contrived species. It occurs when potential implicatures are ‘cancelled’ in virtue of background information pertaining to the situation of discourse or widely understood context including co-text. We ascribe cancellation to potential implicatures which would have arisen for a particular construction had they not been prevented by the context. These meanings are neither intended nor inferred: they are just ‘conceivable in a thought experiment’. It is worth remembering here that Grice was not concerned with issues of processing and hence did not emphasize the distinction between cancellation and non-arising of implicatures. What was essential for him was to stress that there are patterns associated with GCI-type inference. When, however, his cancellation tests are taken outside his particular concerns, we obtain a juxtaposition of two types of cancellation which is at least misleading, if not going against Grice’s original spirit: one is cancellation proper, while the other is not cancellation at all.

GCIs conform well to this criterion of contextual cancellation, as evidenced in (3), but only on the psychologised reading of ‘cancellation’ which we proposed here: cancellation as non-arising. In (3), the emphasis is on John’s arrogance rather than on the number of assessors of his character. The meaning ‘some but not all’ is likely to be neither intended nor inferred.

(3) Some people say John is arrogant.
Potential GCI: Not all people say that John is arrogant.

But then, what Grice would classify as a PCI fares no worse, as in (4), where the sentence uttered by B might in some other contexts be taken as a request or suggestion to the addressee to take the dog for a walk. The implicature that the speaker wants the addressee to take the dog for a walk (see example 2) does not arise in this context.

(4) A: Why are you putting your coat on?
B: The dog wants to go out.

We can safely make two important conclusions at this point: that (i) the explicit/contextual distinction does not even equip us with a test for the GCI/PCI distinction but cuts across this divide, and, even more importantly, that (ii) viewed in this perspective, the very distinction between GCIs and PCIs ceases to make sense. Potential implicatures for a context are nothing but ‘generalized’ implicatures for a linguistic unit which is a theoretical construct: a word
'some', the first sentence in (3), or the sentence uttered by B in (4). The GCI/PCI divide vanishes altogether. As a corollary of this observation, in what follows I will not pay particular attention to the GCI/PCI distinction as it will be tangential to my argument. In other words, examples of pragmatically derived content discussed below should not be thought of in terms of that distinction. In Section 6, I shall introduce a distinction between primary and secondary content where the contents on each side of the divide can be implicit and will be concerned with the role of cancellability in supporting the utility of this new distinction.3

I would like to suggest that explicit and contextual cancellation should not be discussed as part of the same test. Perhaps the fact that Grice did juxtapose them turned them into a pervasive and seemingly reliable test for implicatures. But, to repeat, at the same time it is at least questionable whether types of cancellation that pertain to two different objects (sentence vs. contextually situated speech act) can be so integrated without muddying the issue of cancellability. In what follows I argue, step by step, that this is what seems to have happened due to the unfortunate shortcut in presentation that Grice used exactly thirty years ago in his ‘Further notes on logic and conversation’ (Grice 1978).

3. Explicit and Contextual Cancellability?
Questioning the omnipresence of defeasibility of implicatures, Matthew Weiner (2006: 128) devises the following scenario:

‘Suppose that Alice and Sarah are in a crowded train; Alice, who is obviously able-bodied, is sprawled across two seats, and Sarah is standing. Sarah says to Alice, “I’m curious as to whether it would be physically possible for you to make room for someone else to sit down.”.’

Let us call Sarah’s utterance A. There is no doubt that in this context Sarah conversationally implies that Alice should move and free one of the seats. She utters something which is blatantly false: she is not curious about the feasibility of Alice’s movement but is requesting her to move. The communicated message is not the literal one but instead it is the covert (albeit not so unconventional) act of requesting.4

3 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for making me clarify this point. To repeat, the GCI/PCI distinction is referred to only because it is a point of departure for Grice’s discussion on cancellability but for no other theoretically relevant reason.
4 ‘Not so unconventional’ because asking about the ability is the standard way of conducting a request, discussed widely in Speech Act Theory since Searle’s seminal 1975 paper.
Weiner (2006: 128) builds up the scenario as follows: ‘Suppose now that Sarah adds, “Not that you should make room; I’m just curious.”.’ This utterance (let us call it B) should have the power of cancelling the request that was implicit in the previous statement. Instead, according to Weiner, its effect is the opposite: it strengthens the request, making it even less polite. Weiner argues at this point that since the added utterance is itself non-literal (Sarah is not really curious in either of her statements), there is no cancellation of the implicature conveyed by the first statement. In short, the conversational implicature conveyed by A is only strengthened in B. This implicature is regarded by Weiner as a GCI but this classification is irrelevant for the point I am making. Similarly, Weiner argues (2006: 128-9), particularized implicatures can be persistent through what looks like cancellation phrases. In general, whenever the cancellation phrase is not to be taken literally, it does not perform the cancellation. The problem, Weiner continues, is that the requirement of knowing whether utterance B is to be taken literally makes the cancellation test redundant: the implicature is cancelled when there is no irony or sarcasm, and not cancelled when the ‘cancellation phrase’ is not really a cancellation phrase. So, the conclusion ensues, Grice’s test does not work.

This conclusion is curious indeed. Note that Grice did not formulate the test as a conjunction of explicit and contextual cancellation. He says that a putative implicature can be cancelled and that this cancellation can assume one of two different courses: that in a particular context the addressee’s pragmatic inference is on the wrong track or that there are putative contexts in which it might be on the wrong track. Therefore it is a rather unjustified leap to say that the train scenario constitutes a counterexample to cancellability: a particular scenario on which an implicature cannot be cancelled cannot ever constitute a counterexample to cancellability tout court. The lack of any putative scenarios in which a putative implicature could be cancelled is the least that is required here.

It is for this reason that Blome-Tillmann’s (2008) efforts to save Grice’s cancellability are futile and demonstrate a misreading of Grice. Blome-Tillmann rightly emphasizes that Grice distinguished two types of cancellation: explicit and contextual. To repeat, explicit cancellation takes place when the speaker is able to add to his or her utterance that potentially implicates $p$: ‘…but not $p$’, ‘…but I don’t mean to imply that $p$', or other phrases with an analogous function of cancelling the implicature. Contextual cancellation is the case when it is possible to think up situations in which the implicature $p$ does not ensue. Accordingly, Blome-Tillmann (2008: 156) formulates the principles of Explicit Cancellability and Contextual Cancellability to capture these two options. In this light, he re-examines Weiner’s
example of the train scenario discussed above. He agrees that Sarah’s cancellation phrase ‘Not that you *should* make room’ is a case of Explicit Cancellability but at the same time it is clearly ironic. And being ironic, it affects the situation in a different way from a non-ironic ‘but not *p*’ phrase: it does not cancel the implicature but instead reinforces it. At the same time, Contextual Cancellability is operative: one can devise a scenario in which the request to make room can be cancelled.\(^5\) But then he adds that when *at least one* of these two types of cancellation does not hold, then the meaning in question is not an implicated meaning:

‘Grice thought that since each of these two principles articulates a necessary condition on the presence of conversational implicatures, they provide us with a useful test for when such implicatures are *not* present: if the consequent of at least one of the two principles is not satisfied, Grice contended, then we can be sure that we are not dealing with a case of conversational implicature.’


This is a rather dubious leap: two requirements do not have to equal a flat conjunction. Grice tells us that implicatures can be cancelled in two ways, but nowhere does he say that they necessarily have to be cancellable in a *particular* context by means of a *particular* potential, stipulated cancellation phrase. Moreover, the problem with reading these two requirements as a conjunction stems from the fact that they just cannot be conjoined in that they belong to very different levels of language description. One belongs to situated meaning, in the sense of Mey’s (e.g. 2001, 2007) generalized, situation-embedded speech acts (*pragmemes*), and the other belongs to a more abstract domain of proposition-based, or even sentence-based pragmatic theory. In other words, one cannot conjoin, and make into one principle, a requirement on an utterance in a situation of discourse and a requirement on a sentence to fulfil a certain illocutionary intention in some putative situation of discourse. It is like saying that lemon juice is bad only if (a) lemon juice is bad for the addressee’s hyperacidity or (b) we can envisage a situation in which lemon juice is bad. It goes without saying that Grice did not conceive of cancellation along these lines. Let me explain further. In Weiner’s scenario, utterance B (‘Not that you *should* make room; I’m just curious.’) is in fact a cancellation phrase. Its raison d’être is to convey an intention of cancelling the potential request to move to make room. Whether this intention is sincere or rather is to be interpreted in some other way

\(^5\) For an example of such a scenario the reader is referred to Blome-Tillmann (2008: 158).
is a property of the specific situation. In the scenario at hand, irony or sarcasm are more likely ways in which the attempted cancellation is to be taken. Contextual cancellability is free from this constraint by definition: it requires finding a context in which the putative implicature of a request to move can be cancelled. Blome-Tillmann indeed provides us with such a scenario, as well as a scenario in which the implicature just does not arise – the difference to be discussed in Section 5. It would be frivolous indeed to conjoin a requirement on a particular situation with a requirement on putative situations. Instead, it makes more sense to look upon Grice’s two principles as two aspects of one principle, or two ways of looking at cancellation: either we have cancellation which actually occurs, or we have to pretend, so to speak, and make up a scenario on which it occurs. Stipulating a situation in which it doesn’t occur in spite of an overt attempt to make is occur, as on Weiner’s scenario, is of no use and is defunct as a methodological move.

Failure to notice this correlation between the two facets of the condition led Blome-Tillmann to an attempt to ‘save’ Grice’s cancellability by extending explicit cancellation to putative contexts. While retaining the conjunction requirement, he reworks it as a requirement that contextual cancellability be fulfilled in conjunction with ‘explicit*’ cancellability. ‘Explicit*’ is a variant of ‘explicit’: an explicit cancellation phrase has to be added but it can work only in some putative contexts. This is, surely, like throwing out the baby while keeping the bathwater: at the cost of muddying ‘explicit’, he tries to retain the conjunction. There does not seem to be any reason to prefer his solution to the simple conclusion reached in this section that Grice did not mean a conjunction at all.

Superfluous defence of Grice’s original criterion notwithstanding, the merits of this reopening of the discussion on cancellability are not to be underestimated. Blome-Tillmann’s efforts to ‘save’ the principle are engendered by a correct intuition that, pace Weiner’s argument, the principle is essentially correct. Grice’s fault lies elsewhere: it lies in listing both aspects (nota bene not ‘kinds’) of cancellability as if they were tests for the presence of an implicature which are to be treated as a conjunction. The main unsettling issue arising from this discussion is the actual function of devising a test which utilises a choice between context-internal and context-external cancellability. It is not very helpful or interesting for a pragmaticist engaged in the theory of discourse interpretation to be offered a test which takes him or her outside the discourse at hand. When we analyse a speaker-addressee interaction, resorting to a test which involves constructing an entirely different, alternative scenario seems irrelevant for the study of cognitive processes of the interlocutors and for the study of linguistic units and stages through which discourse processing proceeds. We must remember
that Grice’s theory was strongly entrenched in truth-conditional semantics, understood in the way in which it was customary to understand it in the 1960s and early 1970s: as a theory of sentence meaning, where sentences of natural language had to be reducible to the translations into the metalanguage of predicate logic, and whenever some obstinate words or constructions did not conform, a battery of implicatures was called to the rescue. MeaningNN\(^6\) construed in this way did indeed benefit from any available tests that would make the boundary between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional aspects of meaningNN clear. In the past thirty years of developments in post-Gricean pragmatics, however, the priorities and orientations have significantly altered: the emphasis on the cognitive aspects of utterance processing became strengthened, pace Frege’s objections to psychologism in formal analyses\(^7\). When pragmatic theory of discourse interpretation aspires to cognitive reality, then the explicit cancellation is very important. On the contrary, cancellation outside the current context has to be ascribed a very different status; although some aspects of meaning may conform to contextual cancellation and thereby may be classifiable as ‘pragmatic’ or ‘weaker’ vis-à-vis the lexical content, this distinction may not be reflected in processing. I discuss this issue in Section 5 when I move to the problem of incremental interpretation and automatic sense ascription.

There are also further emerging issues: (i) the applicability of the test to cases of pragmatic inference which, in the post-Gricean tradition, came to be known as parts of what is said rather than what is implicated; (ii) the question of cancellation vis-à-vis non-arising of the implicature; and, last but not least, (iii) the relation between cancellability and salience of such pragmatic meanings. I address these issues below, in Sections 4-6 respectively.

It also has to be pointed out that there is an added difficulty which neither of the two critics of Grice’s criterion mentioned here discusses, namely the distinction between cancellation of a potential implicature and simple correction as a repair mechanism. In the current debate concerning the semantic properties of number terms (see Jaszczolt 2005 for an overview), (5) can be taken as an example of cancellation of pragmatic meaning built out of ‘at least five’ plus a pragmatic ‘cap’ to the effect that ‘not more than five’ (be it implicature or, in more recent post-Gricean frameworks, what is said or explicit), or alternatively as a correction from ‘exactly five’ to ‘exactly ten’.\(^8\)

(5) Look, we can buy the tickets. I have five pounds in my wallet. In fact, I have ten.

\(^6\) Non-natural meaning in the sense of Grice 1957.
\(^7\) See Jaszczolt 2008 on Frege’s ban on psychologism and its applicability to pragmatics.
\(^8\) See also Burton-Roberts 2006 on clarification.
While I will not elaborate on this point in what follows, it needs to be flagged that the boundary between cancellation and correction is still a moot point with respect to some types of expressions.

All in all, the interim conclusion is that Grice’s cancellability test is indeed a reliable criterion for pragmatically inferred meanings but its drawback is that it is presented in the form of two separate, haphazardly juxtaposed, aspects. Presented as such, it is conducive to misinterpretation.

Finally, throughout this debate, it has not been sufficiently emphasized that Grice himself did not regard cancellability as a decisive criterion in distinguishing implicatures. As he explicitly says (Grice 1989: 44):

‘Now I think that all conversational implicatures are cancellable, but unfortunately one cannot regard the fulfilment of cancelability test as decisively establishing the presence of a conversational implicature. One way in which the test may fail is connected with the possibility of using a word or form of words in a loose or relaxed way’.9

He gives the example of saying that a tie is green in certain light conditions, and blue in others. Also, one can say that Macbeth saw Banquo although he only saw his apparition. Being green, or seeing Banquo, are cancellable as far as the literal account of the corresponding (‘truth-making’) situation is concerned but, as Grice points out, this cancellability does not make these statements implicit. But doesn’t it make them pragmatically manipulated, as a result of inference from the contextual assumptions? It seems that just as utterance B does not cancel the pragmatic aspects of the meaning of A, so an attempted cancellation ‘but it is not really green’ or ‘but he didn’t really see Banquo’ don’t cancel anything that was available to the addressee who interpreted the utterances ‘The tie is green’ or ‘Macbeth saw Banquo’. In short, the weakness of the cancellability test is spelled out clearly by Grice himself. The only link that needs to be added is that between non-literality of his scenarios and the somewhat more pronounced non-literality of Weiner’s train scenario. The irony itself belongs to the situated conversational act.

4. Cancellability and Pragmatic Enrichment

9 My emphasis.
We have established that there are legitimate grounds for regarding Grice’s requirement of cancellability as not defunct after all but instead misconstrued as a flat conjunction where in fact the two separate requirements are better viewed as two aspects of the description of the property of cancellability. Having saved it, we can now assess the criterion interpreted in this way and subsequently put it to a new, interesting use. But before we use it in Section 6, we have to prepare the theoretical ground. The next emerging issue is an intra-theoretic one for post-Gricean contextualist accounts. Since the mid-1980s, it has been common in these circles to distinguish between explicit content of the utterance, or what is said, and so-called implicatures proper (e. g. Carston 1988, 1998, 2002; Recanati 1989, 2004).10 Pragmatic aspects of utterance meaning that develop the logical form of the sentence belong to the ‘said’ or the ‘explicit’, while the result of pragmatic inference that adopts the form of separate propositions remains in the category of implicature. Examples (6)-(8) normally trigger interpretations as in (6a)-(8a) respectively. Such pragmatic embellishments are often referred to as enrichment or, more generally, modulation (Recanati, e.g. 2004, 2005, 2007) and, to repeat, produce the said (in the contextualist sense) or explicit content.

(6) Some people liked mum’s cake.
(6a) Not everyone liked mum’s cake./Some but not all people liked mum’s cake.

(7) Tom and Anne got married.
(7a) Tom and Anne got married to each other.

(8) John quarrelled with the boss and was fired.
(8a) John quarrelled with the boss and as a result was fired.

Such pragmatic additions in (6a)-(8a) can all be cancelled in the current context of discourse, as (6b)-(8b) demonstrate. For the purpose of this stage of the discussion, we will regard non-arising of the implicature as a polar case subsumed under the umbrella of cancellation.11

(6b) Some people liked mum’s cake. In fact, absolutely everyone adored it.
(7b) Tom and Anne got married: Tom married Sue and Anne married Mark.

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10 The literature on this topic is vast. For an overview see Jaszczolt 2002, chapter 11 and Jaszczolt forthcoming a.
11 But see also Section 5 on processing.
Explicit, context-internal cancellation is sometimes easy and natural and in other cases harder to justify, as (8b) exemplifies. Cancellation is difficult when the pragmatic enrichment is well entrenched and expected across contexts. In other words, when such enrichments are of the form of salient presumptive meanings (Levinson 2000) or strong social, cultural or cognitive defaults (Jaszczolt 2005), they are harder to cancel explicitly in that they require a rather non-standard scenario. At the extreme end of this scale of cancellability we will encounter cases of ironical statements such as Sarah’s implicit request to Alice to make room discussed in Section 3. But assuming my earlier analysis of Grice’s cancellation requirement, we need not worry; there is the contextual cancellation test which we can apply whenever explicit cancellation is a problem. We can devise at least one scenario on which such pragmatic addition (in the examples (6)-(8) pertaining to enrichment/modulation of the meaning of the uttered sentence) can be exorcised and all is well. For example, when the addressee of (8) is merely supposed to count the misadventures that befell John lately, the temporal and causal links are irrelevant.

In short, this complication of the account of cancellation in post-Gricean pragmatics pertains to the ensuing delimitation of what we can legitimately call an implicature. This delimitation took the angle of what I call (Jaszczolt 2008, 2009, forthcoming b) a syntactic constraint: developments of the logical form of the uttered sentence (but not any other types of pragmatic infiltrations) are not implicit but instead they are rightful components of the truth-conditional content. As a result, the cancellability tests may have to be analysed separately for such developments, exemplified in (6)-(8) above, and for meanings which come with a new, independent logical form. In other words, cancellability may have to be assessed separately for the explicit content/what is said and for the implicit content. Whether it is necessary to distinguish between the ‘said’ and the ‘implicit’ in this way is at the moment an open question. But it is a question that has to be addressed in view of the recent reorganization of the field of what counts as implicit.12 One open option is this. Since the enrichment of the logical form belongs to the truth-conditional aspects of utterance meaning,

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12 See Capone 2006 and 2009 on an attempt to construe explicatures as non-cancellable.
it is very likely that this enrichment has to be performed, by inference or an associative/automatic effect in interpretation\(^{13}\), prior to the calculation of (at least those most salient among) the implicatures as the latter are separate thoughts which are likely to depend on the reconstruction of such intended main meaning. In other words, many implicatures have to, so to speak, ‘take what is said for granted’. However, it is by no means certain that all implicatures build upon a modulated/enriched logical form. At present we can only flag this issue as a possible open question. We will attempt an answer to this question in Section 6 where we will reorganize the playing field by rejecting the principle of distinguishing between *said* and *implicated* founded on the logical form of the uttered sentence and replacing it with the common sense (and very Gricean in spirit) principle saying that the primary meaning, the truth-conditional content of the utterance, corresponds to the main message intended by the model speaker and recovered by the model addressee, irrespective of its degree of resemblance of the logical form of the sentence.

5. Cancellability and Incremental Interpretation

The next issue that emerges is a processing one: how do we know that we are dealing with cancellation of a potential implicature rather than with its lack *tout court*? This reopening of the discussion of Grice’s cancellability is very timely indeed in that it coincides with the debates concerning the exact place or exact moment at which a pragmatic aspect of meaning arises in the interpretation process. For example, in (6), repeated below, the enrichment of ‘some’ to ‘some but not all’ may arise as soon as the word ‘some’ has been processed, or as late as after the entire proposition has been recovered.\(^{14}\)

(6) Some people liked mum’s cake.

The question of the locality of interpretation pertains equally to the pragmatic meaning of all kinds and levels: Grice’s generalized and particularized alike, and, on the various available classifications, the explicit (what is said) and the implicit alike. For the purpose of this section, I flag the problem with locality as such and will not attend to it with respect to these particular categories one by one. The distinctions according to which cancellability is assessed

\(^{13}\) See e.g. Recanati 2007 and Carston 2007 on the debate between inferential and associative enrichments.

\(^{14}\) I have discussed this issue at length in e.g. Jaszczolt 2005, 2006, 2008, forthcoming a.
in my main argument in Section 6 will provide the reader with many pertinent examples should such a detailed consideration be of interest.\textsuperscript{15}

The unit on which enrichment operates has been subject of dispute in the current literature on the topic (see e.g. Levinson 2000; Jaszczolt 2005; Recanati 2007; Carston 2007). Grice’s conversational implicatures are proposition-based, or, to use current terminology, global. The unit responsible for their computation is the entire proposition corresponding to the uttered sentence – further enriched by disambiguation and reference assignment. For Levinson (2000), who concentrates on salient, presumed implicatures, implicatures can be local, pre-propositional. In fact, they can be as local as word-based or morpheme-based. There is no need on his account to process the meaning of the sentence first. The implicature from ‘some’ to ‘not all’ in (6) arises in virtue of his Q-heuristic (‘What isn’t said, isn’t’): if a stronger expression was available and was not used, then we should infer that a situation corresponding to its use in the given context is not the case. Implicatures in (9)-(12) arise through his I-heuristic (‘What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified’). The symbol ‘\(+>\)’ stands for ‘conversationally implicates’, in Levinson’s neo-Gricean sense of ‘implicature’, standing for any pragmatic aspect added to the meaning of the sentence.

\begin{align*}
(9) \quad & \text{bread knife} \quad +> \text{knife used for cutting bread} \\
& \text{kitchen knife} \quad +> \text{knife used for preparing food, e.g. chopping} \\
& \text{steel knife} \quad +> \text{knife made of steel} \\
(10) \quad & \text{a secretary} \quad +> \text{female one} \\
(11) \quad & \text{a road} \quad +> \text{hard-surfaced one} \\
(12) \quad & \text{I don’t like garlic.} \quad +> \text{I dislike garlic. [triggered locally by ‘don’t like’, KJ]} \\
\end{align*}

(adapted from Levinson 2000: 37-38). These implicatures based on the I-heuristic tend to be even more local, so to speak, than the Q-induced ones. They allegedly arise out of the collocations such as ‘kitchen knife’ and single lexical items such as ‘secretary’ without recourse to the sentence. Let us assume for the sake of the argument that Levinson is correct and that pragmatic enrichment can indeed be so radically local. What implications does this view have for implicature cancellation? The implications are serious indeed. It appears that

\textsuperscript{15} I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out that such an exercise may constitute an interesting topic. See also my earlier comments on the tangential role of the GCI/PCI distinction to the use I make of cancellability.
the more ‘local’ the enrichment, the more frequent the cancellation will have to be. Consider a variant of (6b) in (6c).

(6c) Some, and in fact all, of the people liked mum’s cake.

As soon as the word-based enrichment is computed, it has to be cancelled. Similarly in (9a): however unlikely the scenario of using a sharp knife for cutting sheets of plastic might be, it is not utterly implausible and hence is admissible under Grice’s contextual cancellation criterion.

(9a) I bought a sophisticated plastic knife, I mean a knife for cutting sheets of plastic.

The cancellation in (9a) is post-propositional, but is such only accidentally. Consider (9b) where it is easily transformed into a local one.

(9b) The plastic knife I bought today, I mean a knife for cutting sheets of plastic, cost me over £20.

The problem is that such a localist model runs counter to the requirement that an account of utterance processing must reflect the principles of rational communicative behaviour, and in particular reflect the principle of economy of processing which is an instantiation of the general and undisputed (or perhaps even undisputable) principle of economy of rational action. Why would interlocutors follow the norm of local enrichment if it is ineffective and leads to frequent unnecessary cancellations? Cancellations are costly in processing and they must not be assumed to be the norm – it would be a faulty methodological principle to view them as such. Again, as in Section 4, the state of the art on this matter is an open question. For the time being, I reiterate the suggestion offered elsewhere (e.g. Jaszczolt 2008, 2009, forthcoming b) that the most methodologically plausible assumption to follow at this stage of theorizing is that the unit on which enrichment operates varies with the situation at hand. Instead of being bound to the lexical and grammatical units, we should say that ‘some’ may trigger enrichment in some situations of discourse, and resist it or restrain it for a later stage in others. In other words, we have to emphasize the need for pragmemes –pragmatic acts anchored to situation types (Mey 2001: 221) in the definition of the unit on which cancellation operates. Only when the discussion is free from the assumption that cancellation
has to be either local or global, and that lexical items induce or do not induce cancellation across the board, can we put the question forth for experimental testing. The variable, pragmeme-dependent unit for enrichment is such a non-dogmatic assumption.

It has to be pointed out that the debate surrounding locality is intimately connected with the question of salient meanings, also known as default, presumed, automatic, short-circuited meanings, and so forth. The more local the assumptions of interpretation are, necessarily the more context- (and co-text-) free they will be. Put in this way, the issue is intrinsically related to the question of the type of processing involved in arriving at such short-circuited interpretations. A lot of experimental testing is needed before we have reliable answers to questions related to processing but it is legitimate to assume that short-circuited processing will be categorically different from non-short-circuited processing. The latter is inferential and conscious. The first is not only faster but also subconscious, and therefore best regarded as an automatic, associative process.\textsuperscript{16} We are in no position at the current stage of experimentation to allocate the labels ‘inferential’ or ‘automatic’ to particular instances of modification of the basic content of the uttered sentence but it can be safely stated that the distinction itself is not affected by this (hopefully temporary) empirical fact: the onus of proof is on those who try to deny the reality of the distinction and advocate instead different categories under an umbrella term of ‘inference’. Put simply, the problem is this: when the modification is not inferential in the common understanding of the process of inference, it is misleading to subsume it under a broad theoretical construct of ‘inference’. Automatic meanings are a fact of discourse interpretation. But we have to remember that automatic meanings are not ‘automatic for an expression’: they are not attached to lexical constructs. One expression can trigger inferential or automatic interpretation on different occasions. It can also trigger one or the other kind of process for different speakers involved in the same discourse.\textsuperscript{17} Perhaps this is partly the reason why some contextualist find it more plausible to subsume automatic and truly inferential processes under one umbrella term.

\textbf{6. Cancellability and the Syntactic Constraint}

At the end of Section 4 I tentatively suggested that the question of cancellability vis-à-vis the question of the what is said/what is implicated distinction would be better posed had the latter distinction been freed from the syntactic constraint, i.e. the constraint that what is said

\textsuperscript{16} See also Recanati 2004, 2007 and Carston 2007 for a discussion and different views.

\textsuperscript{17} E.g. interpreting ‘Leonardo’ as Leonardo da Vinci can be inferential for some, while automatic for others. It can also vary in its degree of context-dependence with respect to different interpreters, when competing with, say, Leonardo diCaprio. See Jaszczolt 2008 for a discussion.
constitute the development of the logical form of the uttered sentence. I shall now attend to this suggestion in more detail, attempting to justify exorcising the constraint. To repeat, my disclaimer from the previous sections to the effect that the cancellability criterion will now be applied to different post-Gricean distinctions rather than to the GCI/PCI distinction still stands and has to be borne in mind.

A post-Gricean theory which frees the said/implicated distinction from the reliance on the syntax of the uttered sentence is already in place in the form of Default Semantics (henceforth DS, e.g. Jaszczolt 1999, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, forthcoming b). However, until recently, the argument against the syntactic constraint has not been particularly emphasized in the theory. In this section I briefly present the constraint-free distinction between the primary and secondary meaning and the arguments in its support, and subsequently consider the question as to whether the cancellability principle fares better with this distinction than with the syntactic constraint-based one of other post-Gricean contextualist accounts.

It has been demonstrated empirically through extensive questionnaire-based studies that in the majority of cases speakers communicate their main, intended meaning not through the uttered sentence in a bare or enriched form but rather through an implicature proper: a thought whose propositional form, when spelled put, would be independent from that of the uttered sentence (see e.g. Nicolle and Clark 1999; Pitts 2005; Sysoeva in progress; Sysoeva and Jaszczolt 2007 and in progress). As is well known from the literature on Speech Act Theory, the category of an indirect speech act is problematic precisely because there is no reliable criterion for what should count as a direct speech act.18 Analogously, the main, intended message, or the primary meaning, is frequently not the meaning which is directly founded on the logical form of the uttered sentence. Neither is the secondary meaning the ‘implicit meaning’. Instead, the primary/secondary meaning divide cuts across the what is said (explicit)/what is implicit divide. To put it simply: it is a fact of conversation that strongly intended implicit meanings often surface as primary meanings. Accordingly, they are modelled as a category of primary meanings in DS. DS is a contextualist, truth-conditional theory of utterance interpretation, and hence such primary meanings are modelled as units which yield to a truth-conditional analysis.19 For example, in (13), it is the meaning in (13b)

18 See e.g. Allan 1986, vol. 2, chapter 8.
19 Related problems with the function of the explicit content in pragmatic theory have been pointed out by Speaks 2008. He argues, for example, that quantifier domain restriction cannot be explained in terms of pragmatic enrichment of the uttered sentence because there is no corresponding enrichment in the speaker’s thought. Using the traditional Gricean terminology, he refers to the pragmatic specification of quantifier domain as ‘implicature’ and points out that while it is present in the inference from linguistic input, it is absent on the level of the speaker’s thought. His conclusions are modest: Gricean explanations don’t suffice because they
that normally corresponds to the strongest illocutionary (or communicative, depending on the framework) intention and that functions as primary meaning.

(13) Child: Can I go punting?
Mother: You are too small.

(13a) The child is too small to go punting.
(13b) The child can’t go punting.

Guided by mounting empirical evidence that, independently of the level of indirectness of the investigated culture, speakers tend to communicate through implicatures20, DS revises the levels of pragmatic analysis, disposing of the unit which corresponds to the enrichment or modulation of the logical form. Such a unit may, but need not, correspond to the primary meaning and hence must not constitute a separate level. Instead, the levels of primary and secondary meanings are delimited by the sources of information that contribute to the truth-conditional representation and by the types of processes that make up this representation. On the revised version of the theory, the source model is as in Fig. 1 and the processing model as in Fig. 2. The indices ‘pm’ and ‘sm’ stand for ‘pertaining to primary meaning’ and ‘pertaining to secondary meaning’ respectively.

[insert Fig. 1 exactly here]
[insert Fig. 2 exactly here]

The main idea is that the truth conditions are predicated not of a sentence or enriched sentence but of the representation that corresponds to the main message intended by the model speaker and recovered by the model addressee. Truth conditions are ‘pragmaticized’: they are applied to the unit which is produced by merging information coming from the sources specified in Fig. 1, via the processes identified in Fig. 2. The exact descriptions of the sources and processes will not concern us for this purpose and the reader is referred to the literature on DS mentioned above. Suffice it to say that the source ‘word meaning and sentence structure’ is

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20 Sysoeva (in progress) investigated speech acts in English and Russian in a methodologically strictly controlled contrastive experimental study.
responsible for the generation of those aspects of the overall utterance meaning that come from the lexicon and grammar of the uttered sentence. In traditional truth-conditional semantics, compositionality of meaning was sought at this level and as a result it posed insurmountable problems in intensional contexts. ‘Properties of human inferential system’ stands for those features of the architecture of the brain that make our mental states intentional. This source is then responsible for ‘cognitive defaults’ (CD) in Fig. 2, where cognitive defaults are pragmatic aspects of meaning that are automatically added to the content in virtue of the assumed strength of the intentionality of the mental state. For example, the referential reading of a definite description and a de re reading of a propositional attitude report are examples of such cognitive defaults. Another process that is responsible for such automatic/associative meanings is labelled SCWD in Fig. 2. These are social, cultural, and world-knowledge defaults and they pertain to the sources ‘society and culture’ and ‘world knowledge’ of Fig. 1. But it has to be noted that the latter two sources can also be responsible for contributing information through conscious pragmatic inferring (CPI in Fig. 2) – in agreement with the clarification in Section 5 that automatic modifications are not fixed for expression types but are speaker-relative.

In brief, the truth-conditional representation, called here merger representation or Σ (the symbol stands for the summation of information), is the representation of the primary meaning which is freed from the syntactic constraint. Compositionality is not predicated of WS (word meaning and sentence structure), neither is it predicated of an enriched or ‘modulated’ WS. Instead, WS constitutes only one of several sources of information and pertains to only one of several processes that produce the merger representation Σ. It is Σ that is compositional. All processes operate on a par, there is no priority assigned to WS.

Having briefly introduced the idea of primary meaning so construed, we are now in a position to ask some pertinent questions: How does this revised primary/secondary meaning distinction fare with Grice’s principle of cancellability? Does it fare better than the said/implicated distinction which adheres to the syntactic constraint? Is there a categorial difference between primary and secondary meanings with respect to cancellability? And is there a corresponding difference between explicit and implicit meanings? Let us now attempt some plausible cancellations for these two types of distinctions identified in the contextualist

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21 See also the end of Section 5.
23 In virtue of a methodological assumption. See e.g. Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991 and Dekker 2000 on the need for the methodological requirement of compositionality in semantic theory. In DS, compositionality is ‘kicked up’, so to speak, to the pragmatic level of the merger (Σ).
accounts, namely type (i), what is said/explicit vs. implicature, where the said/explicit is understood as the enrichment of the logical form as in (6a) and observes the syntactic constraint, and type (ii), the primary meaning/secondary meaning distinction, where the primary meaning can override the logical form, as is advocated in DS, because it is free from the syntactic constraint. The latter was exemplified in (13b). I attend to them in the remainder of this section.

In order to attend to distinction (i), we shall take an example of an utterance which in a specific context may trigger an inferential or associative enrichment to the explicit meaning, and in addition trigger several strong secondary meanings. Let us use (6), repeated below.

(6) Some people liked mum’s cake.

On standard scenarios, the explicit meaning is likely to correspond to the Grice-Levinson GCI in (6a).

(6a) Not everyone liked mum’s cake./Some but not all people liked mum’s cake.24

We can also stipulate the presence of some context-dependent implicatures which are likely to arise on various scenarios as for example in (14)-(16). We can imagine here a scenario on which the cake was served to the guests at mum’s tea party and failed to trigger even a lukewarm, polite acknowledgement from several members of the assembled party.

(14) Mum’s cakes are quite good but not fabulous.
(15) People’s culinary tastes differ.
(16) Mum’s baking for the tea party was neither a disaster nor a sweeping success.

First, let us test the cancellability of the explicit content itself and embed (6) in a scenario in which the speaker is talking about his/her mother’s tea party. The main content of type (i), corresponding to the explicature/what is said, is cancelled as in (17).

(17) Some people liked mum’s cake. In fact, everyone just devoured it and asked for another piece.

24 I present this content in two different forms in agreement with the two conflicting assumptions as regards the process of enrichment: global (Grice) vs. local (e.g. Levinson). See also Section 5.
It is easy to think of scenarios on which this cancellation may occur and seem ordinary. Naturally, implicatures in (14)-(16) will either not arise on this scenario or will be promptly cancelled during the processing of the second sentence of (17).

Needless to say, following the cancellation in (17), further inferences may ensue – to the effect that mum’s baking was a success, that she is a good cook, and so forth. Let us assume an implicature that is plausible in the context of the cancelled potential explicit content in (17), say (18).

(18) The speaker’s mother is a good cook.

But let us also imagine that the speaker in (17) continues as in (19), cancelling (18).

(19) Some people liked mum’s cake. In fact, everyone just devoured it and asked for another piece. That is not to say that she can be called a good cook in general: she just happened to have mastered this one recipe.

To recapitulate, in (19), the utterance beginning with ‘In fact,…’ cancels the explicit meaning (6a) and the utterance beginning with ‘That is not to say…’ cancels the potential implicature (18). Both cancellations in (19), that of the explicit and of the implicit meaning, sound natural in the given example scenario. Both feel like a denial of a message which is very likely to have been inadvertently communicated by the speaker. In other words, both are straightforward disclaimers of the possible, retrievable propositional content.

Next, let us consider the scenario on which the explicit meaning in (6a) goes through (is not cancelled) and is potentially compatible with the implicatures in (14)-(16). Some of these implicatures are stronger than others but all of them seem to be quite well entrenched. All of the above potential implicatures allow for cancellation, albeit not without some difficulty with bridging inferences. For example, (14) can be cancelled in a putative scenario as in (20). Symbol ‘Æ’ stands for ‘implicates on a type (i) account’.

(20) Some people liked mum’s cake. (Æ Mum’s cakes are quite good but not fabulous.) Her cakes are normally fabulous, really. It is a pity this one was a disappointment.

25 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
One possible explanation of this relative entrenchment is that it is a corollary of the acceptance of the explicit content: when the enrichment of the sentence meaning goes through, this strengthens the probability that the implicatures are on the right track as well.

Let us now move to the distinction of type (ii) and place (6) in a scenario in (21).

(21) A and B are talking about a family dinner, remarking on the fact that it consisted of five courses.

A: Was the food good?  
B: Some people liked mum’s cake.

In this context, the primary meaning, corresponding to the strongest informative intention, can be envisaged as (22) in that it is clearly conveyed that the remaining courses were not particularly good.

(22) The food at the family dinner was not particularly good.

Notice that (22) does not constitute a development of the logical form of (21B) and thereby can only be classified as primary meaning when we allow the primary meaning to be free from the syntactic constraint – following the classification of utterance content proposed in DS.

Some possible secondary meanings for this scenario are listed in (23)-(25). Notice that (24) constituted an inferential step towards the primary meaning in (22).26

(23) The host should have tried harder to produce better tasting courses.  
(24) The remaining courses were not particularly good.  
(25) Speaker B is being critical about the meal on the whole.  
…etc.

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26 The proposal that a secondary meaning can constitute a step towards the primary meaning is not as uncontroversial as it may seem: compare the functionally analogous and experimentally corroborated claim that some implicatures can be processed before the explication.
It is worth pointing out that (6a), which is a development of the logical form of the uttered sentence, is relegated to the position of, at most, a rather weak secondary meaning on this scenario. It is not strongly communicated that only some, but not all, people liked mum’s cake. This content is instead of secondary relevance as compared with (22), namely that the remaining courses were not successful. In fact, the enrichment in (6a) may not even arise at all. It is more important what was not said by B: singling out one item from the menu strongly communicates that nothing else was sufficiently tasty to be praised.

First, the cancellation of the primary meaning where the primary meaning bears no clear structural resemblance to the uttered sentence is given in (26) which is an extension to the scenario of (21)-(22).

(26) A and B are talking about a family dinner.

A: Was the food good?
B: Some people liked mum’s cake. But that is not to say that other courses were bad, I was late and arrived only for the dessert.

The cancellation in (26B) appears rather contrived and unnatural and it requires a bridging inference to the effect that since only one course was a success (and possibly also only for some rather than all, most, or many of the guests), then the dinner couldn’t have been good. But it is not easy to make up a more convincing example. Primary meaning, at least on this scenario, seems to be well entrenched. To further pursue this question of how entrenched primary meanings (main contents in type (ii)) are, let us now take a seminal case of a primary meaning without a syntactic constraint, discussed widely, among others, in Bach (1994) and Jaszczolt (2005). A boy hurts his finger and cries. The mother replies as in (27).

(27) You are not going to die.

Arguably, and according to the principle of the syntactic-constraint-free primary meaning, the primary meaning of (27) in this context is a message to the effect of (28), ascribed to the boy’s mother.

(28) There is nothing to worry about.
Some possible secondary meanings are listed in (29)-(31).

(29) The wound is not deep.
(30) There is no need to get the wound disinfected.
(31) There is no need to drive to the hospital.\footnote{Nota bene, this is the DS stance. To repeat, other contextualist accounts regard what is said/explicit as an enriched proposition – in this case a proposition to the effect ‘You are not going to die from this wound’. It has to be noted, however, that the proposal of an \textit{ad hoc} construction of concepts advocated by Carston (2002, chapter 5) allows for an interpretation of figurative language which arguably brings the explicit meaning of (27) close to my (28).}

Let us try to envisage a plausible cancellation of this intended primary message in (28). (32) is one such possibility.

(32) You are not going to die. But I don’t mean that you shouldn’t take it seriously.

Possible alternatives to the cancellation sentence would be, say, (33) and (34).

(33) But I don’t mean you shouldn’t be concerned about it.
(34) But I don’t mean this is not a serious problem.

(32)-(34) sound outright pragmatically ill-formed. The reason is that (28) simply is the strong, intended, main meaning in this context. Just as our previous example of a primary meaning, it is therefore necessarily entrenched. It also has to be pointed out here that the utterance in (27) cannot be taken literally in this context as its literal meaning does not bear any direct relevance to the situation of a mere cut on the finger. Cancelling the non-literal meaning leaves the residue of the literal and this would be pragmatically flawed. Needless to say, assuming the cancellation in (32), (33) or (34) goes through, analogous to the cancellation of type (i) above, the secondary meanings in (29)-(31) will now either not arise or be promptly cancelled. (32), where the primary meaning is cancelled, may continue for example as in (35) where it is supplemented with a cancellation of the secondary meanings in (29)-(31).
(35) You are not going to die. But I don’t mean that you shouldn’t take it seriously. The wound is quite deep. You should have it disinfected or we should drive to the A&E unit at the hospital to have it checked.

But this fact is not really worth pursuing any further: cancellations in (32)-(34) normally don’t go through and it is so, to repeat, in virtue of the fact that primary meaning is by definition the psychologically real, strong, intentional content tout court. It has to be noted at this point that explicit contents, when they function as primary meaning, will exhibit the same property of entrenchment by the very definition of primary meaning. What is important for the current argument is that they need not be so entrenched and this was demonstrated in our analysis of the type (i) contents in (19), following (6b). To repeat, when the explicit meaning/what is said goes through, it corresponds to the primary meaning on the type (ii) distinction and shares its characteristics. It therefore also engenders quite entrenched secondary meanings.

Next, (36) is an example of a potential secondary meaning that may arise in the context of the cancellation of the primary content in (32)-(34).

(36) The boy should have been more careful.

The secondary meaning in (36) is easily cancellable as in (37).

(37) You are not going to die. But I don’t mean that you shouldn’t take it seriously. I don’t blame you for it though; you wouldn’t have known that that knife was so sharp.

Just as in the case of the cancellation of implicatures associated with type (i) under analogous conditions, so here the cancellation of the secondary meaning appears plausible. We can stipulate that this is so due to the fact that the previous cancellation of the potential explicit content on type (i) and potential primary meaning on type (ii) already make any potential implicatures (type (i)) and secondary meanings (type (ii)) highly speculative and relatively weak. But this is a hypothesis which we can only flag here as a topic worthy of a more in-depth empirical study.

What we have left to assess at this point is the cancellation of secondary meaning on the ordinary scenario where the primary meaning goes through. On this scenario, secondary meanings such as those in (23)-(25) and (29)-(31) seem not to be easily cancellable. Let us
take the secondary meanings (23) and (31). We will look at both of our analysed examples of type (ii) for this purpose because they differ with respect to the feature of literalness (albeit not so much cancellability) of the primary meaning. Both allow for cancellation, as in (38) and (39) respectively, albeit, like in the case of implicatures in analogous contexts in type (i), not without some difficulty with bridging inferences. Symbol ‘\( \rightarrow_{SM} \)’ stands for ‘secondary meaning on a type (ii) account’.

(38) Some people liked mum’s cake. \((\rightarrow_{SM} \text{ She should have tried harder.})\) But I don’t mean that the host didn’t do her best. Under the circumstances, being sick and all that, I was impressed that she managed to entertain at all.

(39) You are not going to die. \((\rightarrow_{SM} \text{ There is no need to drive to the hospital.})\) But we should take you to the hospital to have the wound checked.

In (38), the bridging inference is that (a) if only some of the people liked the food and (b) what they liked was only the dessert, then the host should have tried harder. To repeat, (a) may not even arise in this context and bridging may pertain to (b) alone. In (39) we need a bridging statement that normally when there is nothing to worry about people don’t drive to hospital to be checked. This conclusion is analogous to the one we reached concerning implicatures (14)-(16) in the discussion of type (i).

At this stage we have arrived at a partial answer to the question posed earlier in this section, namely how this distinction between primary and secondary meaning, construed in DS as a distinction which is free from the syntactic constraint, fares with the cancellability criterion. It is clear from the discussion so far that primary meanings are not easily cancellable. This is a predictable and welcome outcome: primary meanings are, to repeat, cognitively real outputs of processing of all available information which is merged in the representation \( \Sigma \), whose status is that of a mental representation and whose role is that of modelling the strongest, main, intended meaning. Cancellation is therefore only a repair strategy. The situation is somewhat different with explicit meaning/what is said on the type (i) distinction which is governed by the syntactic constraint. What is said is not necessarily the main intended meaning and therefore cancellation is not as difficult and as unexpected as in the case of primary meanings. To repeat, the overall tentative conclusion that can be drawn from this preliminary investigation of types (i) and (ii) is that primary meanings,
belonging to the type (ii) distinction, seem to be more difficult to cancel than explicit meanings/what is said, distinguished in type (i). This goes somewhat contrary to the standard conception of the explicit/implicit divide in contextualist post-Gricean pragmatics according to which potential explicit meanings are quite entrenched and potential implicatures are relatively weak, also allowing for various degrees of strength within the category. It appears that the type of meaning which was traditionally relegated to the status of an ‘implicature’ in type (i) just in virtue of its structure but is now rightfully restored as the primary meaning in virtue of its strength of intending in type (ii), is strong indeed and rather difficult to cancel.

What remains to be done to ensure that this line of reasoning is valid is address the question as to whether this entrenchment can be associated with the structure of the uttered sentence alone. In other words, we also have to briefly consider again the meanings which do not correspond to the logical form of the sentence (whether enriched or not) and at the same time do not function as primary meanings and ask whether they are entrenched similar to the meanings which do not correspond to the logical form of the sentence (whether enriched or not) but do function as primary meanings. Implicatures in the situations where explicit meaning is not cancelled, as well as, analogously, secondary implicated meanings in the situations where the primary meaning is not cancelled were both shown not to be easily cancellable in our examples. Next, to repeat, implicatures that are compatible with the cancellation of the explicit content on type (i), and secondary implicit meanings that are compatible with a cancellation of a potential primary meaning on type (ii), as in (18) for type (i) and (36) for type (ii) respectively, are relatively easy to cancel, as evidenced in the scenarios employing (19) and (37). This demonstrates that their behaviour regarding cancellability is not dependent on the fact that they are not developments of the logical form but instead on their role in the primary/secondary distinction. The next step in the tentative conclusion is thus to acknowledge the difference between various instances of the category that in contextualism is dubbed ‘implicature’: potential ‘implicatures’ functioning as primary meanings differ from potential ‘implicatures’ functioning as secondary meanings with respect to the property of cancellability. They are potential main, intended meanings and as such are considerably entrenched. More strikingly, potential implicatures in the type (i) distinction seem to be equally cancellable as potential explicit meanings. It is only when the explicit meaning goes through (becomes the ‘primary meaning’ on the type (ii) terminology) that they become more entrenched.

The final logically possible category we have to consider is that of explicit meanings (corresponding to the development of the logical form of the uttered sentence) which function
as secondary meanings. This is a category which may seem contentious to the advocates of the type (i) distinction but which has to be recognized. To repeat, in the familiar context (21) repeated below, (22) emerges as primary meaning and (6a), if present at all, functions as a secondary meaning.

(21) A and B are talking about a family dinner, remarking on the fact that it consisted of five courses.

\[\begin{align*}
A: & \quad \text{Was the food good?} \\
B: & \quad \text{Some people liked mum’s cake.}
\end{align*}\]

(22) The food at the family dinner was not particularly good.

(6a) Some but not all people liked mum’s cake.

The conclusion that the family dinner was not a success may indeed be partly engendered by the scalar nature of \textit{some}: if only ‘some but not all’ people liked the cake, then it wasn’t very good. But, as was pointed out above, (6a) plays at most only a small ancillary role here. Even if all guests had liked the cake, the dinner may still have been a failure because other courses were disappointing. So, the secondary (albeit explicit) meaning in (6a) is likely not to have arisen on this scenario – or, alternatively, it may be promptly cancelled as in (40).

(40) Some people liked mum’s cake. In fact, all of them did but this didn’t save the dinner.

It has to be emphasized that we have here a rather peculiar case of secondary meaning in that what is cancelled is the enrichment of the sentence meaning. This type of cancellation has to be distinguished for the (rare) cases where what is dubbed the explicit content in type (i) functions as a secondary meaning in type (ii). When the secondary meaning happens to correspond to the explicit content, cancellation has to assume the form of cancelling its most salient meaning of the uttered sentence – the enriched, or pure literal, or figurative one, depending on the default for the context. The final instalment of the conclusion is thus that within the category of secondary meanings, explicit meanings do not appear to be more entrenched than implicit meanings.

7. Conclusions, Disclaimers, and Open Questions
Putting all the instalments of the conclusion together, we observed that there are instances in which potential explicit meanings on the type (i) distinction are easy to cancel, but there are also scenarios on which they are entrenched. Potential implicatures are also more entrenched when the explicit meaning goes through and becomes, so to speak, the primary meaning of type (ii). Potential primary meanings on type (ii) are entrenched. We also observed that potential secondary meanings are cancellable, although they appear more entrenched when the primary meaning goes through. Secondary meanings are normally implicit. But when a potential secondary message happens to correspond to the explicit content of the uttered sentence, it can be cancelled similar to potential implicit secondary meanings. All in all, for type (i), we provided examples of scenarios of some easily cancellable potential explicit meanings, as well as easily cancellable implicit meanings. But primary meanings of type (ii) proved to be well entrenched and we have offered a tentative cognitive explanation of this observation. Finally, we have also demonstrated that secondary meanings, be it implicit or explicit, are cancellable but their degree of entrenchment rises when they follow the primary content, be it implicit or explicit, which is not cancelled.

It has to be pointed out that this study used a rationalist (in the Cartesian sense) method of argumentation which is an alternative method to an empirical enquiry. In other words, we did not use corpora, questionnaires, or experiments. The conclusion was stated using the expressions ‘some implicit meanings’, ‘it is possible for an explicit meaning to be…’, etc. For this particular research question this was the appropriate method of enquiry. We asked about the relationship between primary and secondary meanings as they are defined in the framework of DS, free from the syntactic constraint, vis-à-vis the cancellability of the explicit and implicit content as identified in classifications of type (i) adopted in some other contextualist approaches which adhere to the syntactic constraint. The argument worked on the principle of falsifiability of a hypothesis. We identified a set of plausible scenarios to demonstrate that cancellability is not related to the explicit/implicit distinction. However, on the basis of the patterns of cancellations discussed here, it would be hasty and overly optimistic to assume that there are grounds to hypothesize that the property of cancellability will provide a reliable criterion for distinguishing primary from secondary meanings, although it is almost a truism to say that once the primary meaning is in place, it is not easy to cancel, and the ensuing secondary meanings also become more difficult to cancel. To repeat, this is the case independently of whether primary and secondary meanings are explicit or implicit as the primary/secondary distinction cuts across the explicit/implicit divide. The next stage in these investigations will have to address the question of the stages at which the explicit and
implicit meanings arise in the process of pragmatic inference and pragmatic automatic associations.
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Primary meaning:

- world knowledge
- word meaning and sentence structure
- situation of discourse
- society and culture
- properties of human inferential system

Secondary meanings:

- situation of discourse
- stereotypes and presumptions about society and culture
- world knowledge

Fig. 1: Sources of meaning information contributing to primary and secondary meaning in the revised version of Default Semantics (adapted from Jaszczolt 2009: 132)
Primary meaning:

combination of word meaning and sentence structure (WS)

Σ: compositional merger representation

social, cultural and cognitive defaults (CD)
world-knowledge defaults \( \text{pm} \) (SCWD\( \text{pm} \))

conscious pragmatic inference \( \text{pm} \) (from situation of discourse, social and cultural assumptions, and world knowledge) (CPI\( \text{pm} \))

Secondary meanings:

- social, cultural and world-knowledge defaults \( \text{sm} \) (SCWD\( \text{sm} \))
- conscious pragmatic inference \( \text{sm} \) (CPI\( \text{sm} \))

Fig. 2: Utterance interpretation according to the \textit{processing model} of the revised version of Default Semantics (from Jaszczolt 2009: 132)