1. Justice as fairness as political

Rawls: there are three differences between *A Theory of Justice* and *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*:

1. Reformulation of the principles of justice, especially the equal basic liberty principle.
2. Explanation that the derivation of the difference principle relies not on the stipulation of risk-aversion as a psychological attitude, but on publicity and reciprocity.
3. Justice as fairness as political. This requires:
   a. A conception of what a political theory of justice is
   b. The idea of an overlapping consensus, which explains how a pluralistic society can be well-ordered
   c. Ideas of public justification and public reason

2: Six fundamental ideas

See table.

3: Political not general

Justice applies only to the basic structure. Two implications:
- Justice is applied to the major social institutions, which provide the framework for justice. It does not apply to individuals. Individuals do not have to consider the effect of each of their actions on justice.
- Justice does not apply to institutions internally. Examples: religion and the family.
  - Family slightly different as it plays a role in reproducing society, and in ensuring that citizens have a sense of justice.

4: Political not comprehensive

- Justice as fairness is political because it does not rely on any particular comprehensive conception of the good.
- Principles of justice chosen behind the veil of ignorance, which obscures individuals’ conceptions of the good.
- But the original position is based on the substantive values of freedom and equality.
- Rawls: those conceptions of the good that completely reject freedom and equality even in the political sense are unreasonable.
- A wide variety of comprehensive conceptions of the good can accept freedom and equality as political values.
• Freedom and equality, and thus political liberalism, are applicable to liberal-democratic societies only.

5: Political not metaphysical

• Sandel: *A Theory of Justice* has a metaphysical conception of the person – the unencumbered self - and it is flawed.
• Rawls: the self in the original position / unencumbered self should not be read as a metaphysical conception of the person at all. Instead, it is a political conception.
• People should be treated for political purposes as if they are autonomous choosers of ends, even if many people do not experience themselves in this way, because:
  o Some people are in fact autonomous choosers of ends.
  o Freedom is a crucial liberal value, and freedom requires allowing people to frame, revise and pursue their conception of the good, even if they do not do so.
  o Fact of reasonable pluralism

6: Conclusion

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Readings from the lecture

• John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* especially Lecture I.
2: Six fundamental ideas

1: Society as a fair system of cooperation
   when fully realised

2: A well-ordered society
   which requires

3: The basic structure
   fair terms of cooperation are specified by
   which applies to

4: The original position
   which regards people as

5: free and equal citizens

6: Public justification
   which requires
   Overlapping consensus
   Reflective equilibrium
   Free public reason

Citizens have a sense of justice